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The sharp spike in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of 
East Africa over the last three years has renewed international interest in the 
suppression of maritime piracy.1 While international efforts to curb piracy in 
the region have met with some success, a permanent solution requires that 
local governments take primary responsibility for its suppression. 
Superficially, the situation in East Africa shares a number of characteristics 
with a spate of pirate attacks perpetrated roughly a decade ago on vessels 
traversing the Strait of Malacca. In each case, pirates and armed robbers took 
advantage of a narrow channel, heavily used in ocean-faring commerce. 
Although small-scale robberies remain a persistent problem in the South 
China Sea, attacks on ships traversing the Malacca Strait have diminished 
dramatically following the establishment of a coordination agreement between 
governments in the region. There are surely lessons to be learned from the 
largely successful attempts to control piracy in Southeast Asia, but the nature 
of the situation in East Africa cautions against simply duplicating the 
Southeast Asian approach. The scope of the problem in Somalia, combined 
with the relative weakness of regional governments, suggests that a successful 
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1. There is some debate on the appropriate definition of piracy in international law—
specifically, the difference between piracy and armed robbery at sea. See, e.g., MARTIN N. MURPHY, 
SMALL BOATS, WEAK STATES, DIRTY MONEY 7-21 (2009). This Essay is primarily concerned with the 
efficacy of existing international efforts to stem maritime piracy and so will simply adopt the definition 
of piracy endorsed by the International Maritime Organization. See United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
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regional cooperation agreement will require international legal and financial 
support.  
II. CHARACTERIZING EAST AFRICAN PIRACY 
Although piracy on the high seas has been a persistent feature of 
seafaring commerce for centuries, the number of reported acts of piracy began 
to dwindle in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; however, in the last few 
decades of the twentieth century, the rate of piratical attacks sharply increased 
worldwide.2 In 1984, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) began 
providing statistics on reported acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in 
response to increased international interest in the suppression of piratical acts. 
After reaching a peak of 471 incidents in 2000,3 the annual rate of piratical 
attacks generally declined through 2006, during which the IMO reported just 
241 attacks.4  
Since 2006, the annual rate of pirate attacks has again been rising 
precipitously, driven largely by the rapid expansion of pirate activity in the 
East African region.5 The IMO reported thirty-one incidents of piracy in the 
region in 2006,6 sixty in 2007,7 and one hundred and thirty-four in 2008.8 At 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
2. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, An Overview of Piracy in the First Decade of the 21st 
Century, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 441, 443 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 
2008); see also Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., The Law of Piracy, in PIRACY AT SEA 168, 168 (Eric Ellen ed., 
1989) (“Having enjoyed a fairly long period during which recorded acts of piracy were few and far 
between, we are now thrust into a new era in which, for various reasons, piracy has in fact become 
rampant in many parts of the globe.”). 
3. INT’L MARITIME ORG., MSC/CIRC.991, REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED 
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, ANNUAL REPORT—2000, at 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=915/991-col.pdf. 
4. INT’L MARITIME ORG., MSC.4/CIRC.98, REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED 
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, ANNUAL REPORT—2006, at 1 (2007) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2006], 
available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=8028/98.pdf. 
5. See INT’L MARITIME ORG., MSC.4/CIRC.133, REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED 
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, ANNUAL REPORT—2008, at annex 4 (2009) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 
2008], available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=11376/133.pdf. 
6. ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 4, at 1. 
7. INT’L MARITIME ORG., MSC.4/CIRC.115, REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED 
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, ANNUAL REPORT—2007, at 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=9837/115.pdf. 
8. ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 5, at 1. 
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the time of this writing, IMO reports for 2009 are available only through June, 
but they suggest that the piracy problem in Somalia is continuing to worsen. 
Including attempted acts as well as those actually committed, the IMO 
reported seventeen incidents in January, ten in February, thirty-five in March, 
forty-four in April, thirty-one in May, and seventeen in June.9 Assuming that 
this rate is maintained, in 2009 there will be as many attacks in the East Africa 
region as there were worldwide in 2008.10 
While the sheer number of incidents that have occurred off the eastern 
coast of Africa is itself significant, the novel character of the attacks makes 
the situation even more troubling. Whereas pirate activity in most areas of the 
world is typified by small-scale theft against ships at anchor in territorial 
waters,11 attacks in East Africa are often carried out against large commercial 
vessels sailing hundreds of miles from the Somali coast and frequently result 
in the target vessel being hijacked and held for a ransom. The following 
paragraphs explore these differences in greater detail. 
Nearly eighty percent of attacks worldwide in 2008 were conducted 
within twelve nautical miles of the shore, and in the vast majority of these the 
target vessel was stationary.12 In East Africa, we find just the opposite: in 
2008, forty-seven attacks were committed against steaming ships compared to 
a mere ten attacks while the target was at anchor.13 Moreover, while many of 
the incidents in international waters near Somalia have in fact occurred fairly 
close to land, attacks have also been carried out far from the coastline.14 In 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
9. See INT’L MARITIME ORG., MSC.4/CIRC.130, REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED 
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, ACTS REPORTED DURING JANUARY 2009 (2009), available at 
http://www.imo.org (follow “Circulars” hyperlink; then follow “MSC.4” hyperlink).  Subsequent 
months’ reports are also available via the IMO hyperlink path. 
10. The IMO reported 306 attacks in 2008. ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 5, at 4. 
11. See id. at 2, annex 2. 
12. The target vessel was confirmed to be steaming in only twenty-two percent of reported 
incidents. See id. at 2, annex 2. 
13. Id. 
14. For example, in late 2008 the MV Faina was seized over two hundred nautical miles from 
the shore. See Jeffrey Gettleman & Mohammed Ibrahim, Somali Pirates Get Ransom and Leave Arms 
Freighter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A6. Attacks this far from land are typically carried out from a 
“mother ship” from which pirates launch small skiffs when a target vessel is sighted. See Roger 
Middleton, Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars 4 (Chatham House, 
Briefing Paper No. AFP BP 08/02, Oct. 2008). 
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response, the International Maritime Bureau’s Pirate Response Center has 
recommended staying six hundred nautical miles from the coastline when 
traveling past the East African coast in its most recent set of guidelines for 
avoiding pirate attacks.15 But even this extensive buffer may not be enough: in 
April 2009, a fishing trawler was hijacked 630 nautical miles southeast of 
Mogadishu.16 
Second, hijacking—defined here as a pirate attack that results in the 
seizure of the target vessel—is very rare outside of East Africa: the IMO 
reports that in 2008 forty-four vessels were hijacked in East African waters as 
compared with just seven in other regions.17 This trend shows no signs of 
abating: in the first four months of 2009, there were twenty-five hijackings in 
East Africa and only three elsewhere in the world. 18  Moreover, when a 
hijacking does occur outside of East Africa, the goal rarely seems to be 
ransom.19 Instead, attackers frequently kill or maroon the crew and seize the 
ship in order to create a “phantom vessel” useful for other criminal 
activities.20 Hostage-taking is also disproportionately common in East African 
pirate attacks: In 2008, 703 crewmen were taken hostage in the region while 
only seventy-one hostages were taken elsewhere in the world.21 Consequently, 
pirate attacks to secure ransom payments have systematized in East Africa to a 
degree unseen in the rest of the world.  
Finally, piracy in East Africa is distinguished by the size and nature of 
the ships targeted for attack. For example, in late 2008, pirates based in 
Somalia seized the Sirius Star, a Saudi oil tanker carrying $100 million worth 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
15. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU PIRACY RESPONSE CENTER, BEST MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES TO DETER PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN AND OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA 6 (Feb. 2009), 
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hijackings accounted for just seven percent of all reported acts of piracy. 
19. See Menefee, supra note 2, at 449. 
20. Middleton, supra note 14, at 11. 
21. ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 5, annex 2. 
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of crude.22 In early 2009, a $3 million dollar ransom was paid for the ship’s 
release.23 Just one month later, a $3.2 million ransom was paid for the MV 
Faina, a freighter captured the previous September while hauling thirty-three 
Soviet T-72 tanks and a cargo of weapons and ammunition.24 While piracy in 
other areas of the world also has a significant financial impact and threatens 
the safety of mariners, the factors outlined in the preceding paragraphs render 
piracy in East Africa a particularly grave danger. 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S RESPONSE 
International efforts to suppress piracy in the region have generally 
taken the form of supplying naval forces to detect and interdict pirate attacks. 
However, the long term suppression of piracy in the region requires that 
governments take over responsibility for securing their own coastline and 
suppressing pirate activity in their territorial waters. Noting the dramatic 
reduction in pirate activity in Southeast Asia following the conclusion of the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships (ReCAAP), governments in the region have begun to 
implement a similar system for coordinating anti-piracy efforts. However, the 
East African and Middle Eastern states that would be parties to such an 
agreement do not have resources, financial or legal, commensurate with the 
scope of the Somali pirate threat. This Part will examine the effectiveness of 
international security fleets and motivate the necessity for increased local 
involvement in the suppression and prosecution of piracy. 
There are currently a number of international fleets dedicated to 
combating piracy in the region. In January 2009, the United States Naval 
Forces Central Command established Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) to 
conduct anti-piracy missions off the Somali coast.25 In the past year, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has also deployed fleets to the region to 
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conduct anti-piracy operations. Operation Allied Provider was launched in 
October 2008 to provide security for World Food Program deliveries of food 
aid to Mogadishu.26 This operation was terminated in December 2008 after the 
European Union established Operation ATALANTA to fulfill the same role.27 
In March 2009, NATO initiated Operation Allied Protector, tasked generally 
with disrupting pirate attacks against vessels traversing the region.28 
These multinational fleets have engaged in a number of distinct anti-
piracy missions. For example, CTF-151 has established a “Maritime Security 
Patrol Area,” a stretch of ocean in the Gulf of Aden patrolled by coalition 
warships. Although a useful service, this provides protection only in a small 
area of the Gulf of Aden.29 This idea might be extended by creating escorted 
convoys of merchant ships, but given the high volume of commercial traffic 
through the region, such a system may prove too costly to administer.30 Rather 
than organizing corridors or convoys, the international community might also 
simply increase the naval presence in the region. However, given the rapidity 
of the attacks (as few as fifteen minutes might elapse between the first 
indications of a pirate attack and the boarding of the target vessel)31 and the 
vast expanse of ocean threatened by Somali pirates, it is unlikely that a 
military vessel will reliably be in range to stop an attack in progress. 32 
Attempting to interdict against pirate attacks on the high seas is at worst an 
ineffective and at best an extremely inefficient solution.  
There are also significant legal concerns inherent in the suppression of 
piracy in East Africa by foreign states. Acts of piracy have long been held 
subject to universal jurisdiction.33 However, while international law provides 
a definition for piracy34 and provides states authority to detain and try pirates, 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
26. Id. at 20. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See Middleton, supra note 14, at 10. 
30. See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 26. 
31. See Middleton, supra note 14. 
32. See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 106. 
33. Pirates have long been held hostis humani generis, and so could be apprehended on the 
high seas by vessels of any state and tried and punished by any jurisdiction into which they were 
brought. See P.W. Birnie, Piracy Past, Present, and Future, in PIRACY AT SEA, supra note 2, at 132; 
MURPHY, supra note 1, at 12.  
34. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 101. 
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the substantive aspects of prosecutions for piracy are generally conducted 
under the local law of the capturing state. 35  This proves problematic for 
several reasons. First, the United States and the European Union, which 
provide the majority of the international naval presence in the region, lack 
experience in conducting enforcement targeting piracy or prosecuting piracy 
cases.36 For example, before the capture of Abduwali Abdukhadir Mose and 
his subsequent arraignment in federal court in the Southern District of New 
York,37 the most recent piracy case tried in United States courts was in 1861.38  
There are also concerns about the human rights implications of 
prosecution by a state participating in the formation of Coalition navies.39 
Even setting aside prosecution, merely capturing pirates may open the 
apprehending state to unexpected human rights proceedings. For example, the 
United Kingdom Foreign Office, worried that handing pirates over to local 
Islamic authorities might violate their human rights or that captured pirates 
may try to claim asylum, directed the Royal Navy to refrain from detaining 
pirates.40  
The suppression of piracy by foreign states is thus problematic as both a 
pragmatic and a legal matter. In the long term, regional governments must 
take primary responsibility. Following the model of ReCAAP, signed by 
sixteen Asian nations and in force since 2006,41 the IMO has to that end 
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provisions of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention), which provides that states enact domestic law to criminalize, for 
example, “seiz[ing] or exercis[ing] control over a ship by force.” SUA Convention art. 5, Mar. 10, 1988, 
1678 U.N.T.S. 221 (referring to an offense specified in Article 3(1)(a)). 
36. See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 107. 
37. See James Bone, Somali Pirate Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse in US for Maersk Alabama 
Hijack Trial, TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ 
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38. See The Savannah Privateer: Trial for Piracy—Great Throng in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
24, 1861. 
39. See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 107 (noting that human rights appeals are a significant drain 
on the prosecuting state’s resources and may “place the final outcome of a prosecution in some doubt”). 
40. See Marie Woolf, Pirates Can Claim UK Asylum, TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 13, 2008, 
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3736239.ece; see also MURPHY, supra 
note 1, at 107. 
41. See James Kraska, Developing Piracy Policy for the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 2, at 331, 369-70. 
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sponsored the creation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, a regional 
cooperation agreement adopted by seventeen regional governments in January 
2009, nine of which have subsequently signed the agreement.42 Among other 
things, the agreement calls for the construction of a Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre in Mombasa, Kenya, a Sub-Regional Coordination 
Center in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and a regional information center in 
Sana’a, Yemen.43  
Some commentators have credited ReCAAP and other regional 
agreements for the substantial reduction in pirate activity in the South China 
Seas, but there are reasons to believe that such an agreement will meet with 
less success in East Africa. For instance, the Strait of Malacca, long the center 
of piracy in Southeast Asia, is a narrow channel between continental 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.44  Pirate activity in Southeast Asia 
therefore occurred primarily within easy reach of the maritime enforcement 
organizations of stable, industrialized nations. Piracy in East Africa, on the 
other hand, occurs over a vast area of the Indian Ocean. However, it is the 
absence of a stable, functioning government in Somalia that will ultimately 
prove fatal to a regional cooperation agreement.  
At the most basic level, piracy in East Africa is the result of the 
weakness of the Somali and other regional governments and the absence of 
other significant economic opportunities. 45  Improved cooperation and 
coordination are empty promises unless regional governments are able to 
effectively police their own territorial waters. Though Yemen has been able to 
contribute a number of vessels to Coalition navies,46 the fact that Yemen 
remains the principal supplier of illegal arms to Somalia47 suggests that the 
Yemeni navy will be unable to meaningfully deter pirate activity without 
international support. More critically, the Somali government and private 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
42. See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 25. 
43. Id. 
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actors have met with little success in establishing a maritime security force in 
the region.48 An internationally supported force may prove more successful. 
No such program has been officially implemented to date, though on July 28, 
2009, the European Union announced its intention to train a local Somali anti-
piracy force.49  
It is also crucial that local governments take a leading role in the 
prosecution of pirates captured either by regional security forces or 
international fleets. To that end, Kenya has signed agreements with both the 
European Union and United States in early 2009 to receive pirates captured in 
East African waters.50 Furthermore, the Djibouti Code of Conduct calls on 
signatories to ensure that local law provides an avenue for prosecuting 
suspected pirates.51 However, the sheer scale of the piracy problem in the 
region may overwhelm the local justice systems’ financial and legal 
capabilities: the commander of CTF-151 recently reported that over one 
hundred pirates had been turned over to governments for prosecution since the 
force’s inception.52  This suggests that international legal and financial 
assistance be necessary to strengthen local jurisdictions’ prosecutorial 
capacity as well. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The suppression of pirate activity in East Africa will require, in the long 
term, nothing less than the establishment of a functioning Somali government. 
Still, short term efforts to affect the balance between the potential costs of 
engaging in piracy and the potential rewards may be able to control, if not 
entirely eradicate, pirate activity in East Africa. While international efforts to 
deter piracy in the region have proven somewhat helpful in this regard, 
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ultimately local governments should and must take a leading role in 
controlling pirate activity in East Africa. The establishment of a regional 
cooperation agreement like ReCAAP is a step in the right direction. However, 
the lack of a functional government in Somalia and the relative weakness of 
other regional governments, combined with the broader geographical region 
subject to attack, will limit the Djibouti Code’s effectiveness. International 
support to strengthen both enforcement and local prosecutorial capacity is 
necessary before an East African regional agreement will be able to replicate 
the successes of ReCAAP. 
 
